The Indian Army Part 3
Safety in numbers
Indian Army’s record has many parallels with that of the Indian cricket team; one unmitigated disaster (1962), one unqualified success (1971), two stalemates (1948 and 1965), a cataclysmic foreign policy blunder (IPKF in Sri Lanka) and a pyrrhic PR victory in Kargil (1999). The pusillanimous display by the top brass and their strategic and leadership failures have been offset by bravery and courage of young officers and soldiers (For a pithy insight into the Kargil war, see A Soldiers Diary, Kargil: The Inside Story by Harinder Baweja, Books Today, 2000). In the history of modern warfare, human casualties have reduced drastically since the Second World War and these days, it is only in internecine and tribal wars in Africa and the Middle East that such heavy casualties take place. It is ironic that these heavy casualties have been brandished around by the Indian army as tales of valour and sacrifice, that divert attention from and gloss over major strategic and organisational deficiencies. The Charge of the Light Brigade would be an apposite comparison – individual bravery and sacrifice amidst inept handling by the top brass. The official Indian army website makes a virtue out of necessity.
A common indicator of the type of leadership extant in the Army are casualty ratios. In all our wars, officer casualties have been high. This is an internal assessment criterion. Management experts point out that high casualties bespeak of poor command. The point, however, is that Officers of the combat arms lead from the front and do not manage from the rear.
The quality, unfortunately in this case, is directly related to the quantity. While the world has flattened, the Indian Army has added to its hierarchical structure along with a significant increase in numbers. Protecting one’s fiefdom and enlarging its scope has been the hallmark of most government bodies and the army is no exception. The US army has been blindly aped by creating an Army Training Command more than 15 years ago, with no reduction in the training directorate at Delhi. South-western command and a new corps have been raised to ostensibly improve the operational effectiveness of the army. But many insiders believe that it is to create more avenues for promotions at the middle and higher levels. A new operational logistics and a public information directorate were also created in the recent past, adding to the existing layers of military bureaucratic structure. While all this has happened, there has been no talk of reduction in numbers ala the western armies. The US, UK and French military training schools are either outsourced or largely manned by civilian employees. No modern army worth its name runs its own logistics; their logistics is totally outsourced. The Indian army, on the other hand, still waxes eloquent about its teeth-to-tail ratio and takes pride in the large inventory of its ordnance corps – from a shoe nail to a tank.
Can we have a leaner army that is as effective an insurance for the nation’s future? Arguably, yes. General Malik reduced 50,000 in his tenure as the army chief, but it all went away in the aftermath of Kargil. The political willingness to correct this anomaly is distinctly lacking. After all, there is safety in numbers. The annual report of the ministry of defence (2006-07) puts forth this grandiose justification in buckram prose.
India’s national security environment is determined by a complex interplay of its geographical attributes, historical legacy, and socio-economic circumstances as well as regional and global developments…The security environment that has been highlighted above clearly brings out four key elements that are fundamental determinants of our security planning. These are:
- The Indian Armed Forces have a two front obligation, which require them to safeguard the security of our borders with Pakistan as well as with China;
- India is not a member of any military alliance or strategic grouping, nor is this consistent with our policies necessitating a certain independent deterrent capability;
- Due to external abetment, India’s Armed Forces are involved in internal security functions on a relatively larger scale than is normal requiring a force structure that will be able to cope with it; and
- India’s interests in the North Indian Ocean, including the security of our EEZ and Island territories, highlight the need for a blue water Naval capability commensurate with our responsibilities.
Notwithstanding this pontification, acquisition of modern military equipment and implementation of latest military strategy in the current geopolitical scenario should have led to a concomitant reduction in the strength of the army. This reduction can not be to please the peaceniks or to score brownie points at international platforms; it should be based on current geopolitical realities, acquisition of latest weaponry and equipment, concurrent organisational changes and a coherent military strategy. The modernisation plans have not even been finalised in the past, as with the tenth plan, and it would be naive to hope for any improvements with the eleventh plan. In any case, these capital acquisition plans need money and three-quarters of the army budget goes towards salaries and other revenue expenses. So, where does one start? The hawks may seek larger allocations to the army for modernisation but the cogent argument is that the numbers must reduce for greater capital acquisitions. It has to be a well thought out process, backed by deft political and diplomatic manoeuvres, and implemented after a fundamental change in the noesis of the top military brass. This is not to make a case for a cadaverous army, but to trim the extra fat for a well sculpted lean and fit fighting machine; else the organisation will continue to be wanner by the day.
Besides, the happenings after the parliament attack and the détente with Pakistan are a pointer to the geopolitical situation that befalls the Indian army. Kargil could not escalate into a full fledged war due to international fears of a nuclear showdown. In his book ‘The world is flat’ Thomas Friedman has highlighted the pressures at the highest levels on the Indian government that prevented the détente with Pakistan from escalating in 2002. A full-fledged war with Pakistan and China seems far-fetched at the moment, but it would be imprudent to rule out its possibility altogether. In any case, it has been acknowledged in most quarters that the army was unable to mobilise in time after the parliament attacks and thus the small ‘window of opportunity’ was lost. The current army chief thus came up with a new strategy to mobilise faster and score short term gains (read occupation of enemy territory) before international pressure leads to a ceasefire. But even this hortatory thinking and bold strategy hasn’t been backed by any talk of reducing the strength of the army. What you hear in turn is the huge shortage of officers in the army – this is again a myth that needs to be demolished.
To be continued…
In my profession (medicine) anyone may say anything - but what counts finally is credentials which are an indicator of the possibility that a person may actually know what he is talking about - as opposed to being a good talker.
Who are you? More to the point, what are you?
shiv
Comment by shiv — June 21, 2007 @ 3:35 pm
Shiv
Fair question. Backing an opinion with a name makes it more credible. Unless, of course, you are reading The Economist.
Notwithstanding this, one advantage of anonymity is that it allows us to separate out the author from his argument. Especially in the Indian context, an expert in one field immediately acquires the status of an expert in all others: certain Nobel and Booker prize winners come to mind.
In this case, I’d say that anyone who has treated the topic in such depth should know a thing or two about it.
Comment by Nitin — June 21, 2007 @ 7:27 pm
Is this the same lean mean machine advocated by Rumsfeld.
We know how that eneded.
Much of modern warfare consists of holding actions, no lean blitzkrieg force is going to accomplish that.
Also remember that the rules of engagement will change with your force structure and levels.
This is why we have America dropping daisy cutters on childrens schools. Compare that with the IA’s careful door by door engagement in Kashmir. Can they level the place, yes, but their rules of engagement tell them no to.
Careful what you ask for. I would give the benefit of the doubt to the Soldier every time.
As far as disparaging the officer corp, look at the casualty list of officers to enlisted men. It is one of the highest for any conflict in the world.
Comment by Theo — June 21, 2007 @ 11:45 pm
Theo,
There’s no comparison between the US and Indian armed forces: the former relies on technology and hardware while the latter, regardless of shedding some weight, will remain manpower intensive for a long time.
The point is not about trying to make the Indian Army more Rumsfeldian. Rather, to note that the Indian army can be made more efficient—by taking the non-core elements out. As this series of posts points out, not all the 1 million+ personnel in the army are involved in combat/combat-support.
The (justifiable) pride we have in our army should not make us blind to the pursuit of greater efficiencies. Btw, elsewhere the author makes a nuanced point about the casualty ratio of officers to enlisted men. It’s a fair point. That our young officers are leading from the front is commendable. But casualties shouldn’t be something we should be boasting about.
Comment by Nitin — June 22, 2007 @ 1:53 pm
Let’s face it. The Indian army is untested. It has not fought a war with US or European foes, unlike China.
The Chinese republic was born in 1949 and in 1950, they were fighting the US in the Korean War. They suffered huge casualties but succeeded in getting the US to withdraw from the N Korean border. Since then their army has been active in the Vietnam war and has earned a formidable reputation. there is a thriving arms export industry.
Poor India by comparison has only clashed with a puny Asian neighbour (Pakistan) or its own disgruntled minorities. India no doubt has assembled some awesome hardware bought from the top aggressors - US, EU & Russia. So who will be used against? They dared not challenge China.
That leaves good old Pakistan. Pathetic, isn’t it?
eddie
Comment by Eddie — June 23, 2007 @ 11:42 pm
“Separating the author from the argument” is great fro arguments, but is of little practical use for anything serious.
Neutrality in writing and opinions cannot be taken for granted and separating names from statements in fact add several confounding arguments about neutrality and possible lack of knowledge. The article above is full of rhetoric - and I will post questions that I have about the article, which I believe is written by a person who does not know much about the subject, but writes rhetoric well enough to come out sounding like he knows something:
Quote:
“While the world has flattened, the Indian Army has added to its hierarchical structure along with a significant increase in numbers.”
I would like to know what is the connection between the first half of the sentence and the second half. A great piece of meaningless rhetoric.
Quote:
“While all this has happened, there has been no talk of reduction in numbers ala the western armies. The US, UK and French military training schools are either outsourced or largely manned by civilian employees.”
Military training outsourced? Examples please. Also an analysis of how these nations might have such a large body of capable civilian military trainers based on their history and what they have been up to in the past 20-50 years to acquire and nurture such a civilian skill base.
Quote:
“No modern army worth its name runs its own logistics; their logistics is totally outsourced.”
Please name some armies that are worth their salt. I would like to be educated on how the effectiveness or role of an army can be measured in terms of salt? Is this some new kind of currency that is being mooted on an economy blog? No substance. Mo meat of facts to buttress the bare-bones rhetoric.
Quote:
“Can we have a leaner army that is as effective an insurance for the nation’s future? Arguably, yes.”
And arguably NO. If you study the needs of counterinsurgency operations, you find that there may be a need for more men. And the “outsourced” army that is worth its salt, the US army is hiring too. Shouldn’t we of the aforementioned flat world be copying that? Or is it only the author’s, one sided anonymous opinions on a non peer reviewed blog count?
Quote:
“Notwithstanding this pontification, acquisition of modern military equipment and implementation of latest military strategy in the current geopolitical scenario should have led to a concomitant reduction in the strength of the army”
“Should have”? “latest military strategy”? What is he/she talking about? Whose strategy? Under what circumstances? Details. Details. Where are the details? Ignorance of military strategy and history is so easily covered up by bluster and more of the very pontification that author claims to oppose.
Comment by shiv — June 24, 2007 @ 10:04 am
Shiv,
Many thanks for analysing the post so critically and in such great depth. You have raised certain legitimate queries and maybe I need to improve my writing style to match your exacting standards. The issues of identity, expertise, rhetoric, opinions and facts are subjective and can be debated endlessly.
The moot point is “How do you get more bang for the buck?”.
If you check the first post in the series, the parliamentary standing committee on defence has made the same point - Can we have an equally effective army, by reducing wasteful(your definition and mine of wasteful might not be the same!) numbers and this has to be done in the light of modern management practices, current geopolitical situation and by introduction of modern technology and acquisition of latest military equipment. It is, to use a cliche, the eternal Productivity vs Production debate.
Despite its special and a preeminent role, Army is also, in many ways, like any other organisation and one neeeds to explore ways to make any organisation better. It is an area that concerns everyone - most defence observers have written about it, there have been in house studies by the Army itself and by the ministry of defence. There are many ways to look at it and I am trying to look at the whole issue through a different perspective.
I am certain, you more than anyone else, would want more resources for the beleaguered soldier and lesser Indian casualties in conflict. With the increase in defence budget unlikely and the revenue to capital expenditure ratio showing no signs of improving, this seems to be the only logical way out. I rest my case.
Comment by Pragmatic — June 24, 2007 @ 11:11 am
Again, What you are talking about is the teeth to tail ratio. In the US army this right now about 10% teeth to 90% tail. Not exactly the most efficient at first sight.
Also remember the rules of engagement. The American reliance on hardware and technology is what improves the T-to-T ratio, but this means that they have to stand back and blast away.
Also the ‘outsourced’ logistics teams have no conception of rules of combat or a real ability to defend themselves, and contrary to expectations they are NOT cheap. Witness the $80 a gallon of gas debacle in Iraq. The americans can afford this, we can not.
If you wish to reduce casualties then prepare to change the rules of engagement. You can not have one without the other.
Comment by Theo — June 26, 2007 @ 11:39 pm
I would agree with Pragmatic that there is a need to re-examine our staffing pattern of the Army to enhance its capability. Are we dynamic in thought, action, and more importantly attitude to respond to changing requirements of warfare. I think there is a major gap there.
If we analyse military history we find that often armies continue to remain rooted in outdated mindsets. military setbaks then provide the impetus to change.
There is merit in issues raised by pragmatic.
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