I will try to briefly summarise your points and answer them. Please bear with me.

1. The Indian Army’s record is as mixed/Chequered as the Indian Cricket teams record.
2. The top brass has been incompetent.
3. In an age when casualties have been going down IA’s officer casualties have been high, a fact that is (wrongly) a source of pride for the Army.
4. We need a leaner army and should outsource non core functions like “for profit” corporations do.
5. The Indian army has created commands and offices merely to facilitate the promotions of senior officers.
6. The huge shortage of officers in the army is a myth.

My Points

1. The IA’s record needs to be looked at in the context of the flexibility that it has been offered by the bureaucratic and political classes. 1948 was mixed because Nehru gave the go ahead for entry in to Kashmir when the Pakistani forces (which had been preparing the invasion for quite some time) were 20 miles from Srinagar. Considering that we still hold 2/3rds of Kashmir and the cease fire was declared only because Nehru wanted to go to the UN, it is unfair to call the war in 1948 a stalemate. We were justifiaby defeated in 1962 by China, but this cannnot be divorced from the ill advised policies followed by Nehru and Krishna Menon (”Kaul”isation of the army brass, Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai, “The only Security Force India needs is the Police, i would rather not have an army” - Nehru, throwing an unprepared army against a motivated enemy). In 1965, inspite of the army recovering from the defeat of 1962, superiority of the the equipment at the disposal of the PAF and the pakistani Armoured Corps, and the general unpreparedness with which operation gibraltar caught it, the army fought marvelously (please read the TIME report which clearly says that India won the war, and also the wikipedia section on the gains and losses during the war. It will give you a better idea about whether it was a stalemate or not).1971 was a victory without paralel. I dont know why you call Kargil a pyrrhic PR victory. The objective of the army was to throw out the intruders without crossing the IB at any other place. This they did admirably with lesser casualties than the Pakistanis inspite of the fact that they were at a huge disadvantage due to the terrain. IPKF was a disaster both in terms of casualties and the diplomacy accompanying it, but it was more due to the muddleheaded policies of Rajiv gandhi than the army. Also it was the only time when a force was able to bring peace and stability to the Jaffna peninsula. A little more research in to the nature of the conflicts and the conduct of the armed forces given those contraints would have made your article more credible instead of sounding like an Arundhati Roy wannabe piece.

2. May be and maybe not. It would be better if you could give more compelling evidence.

3. I think you have failed to understand that the proportion of officers is much higher in the IA compared to the Pakistani Army and the US army. This may be because of the fact that India follows a british model where the bulk of the work is done by the Commisioned officers while pakistan follows the US model where the bulk of the work is done by the JCOs and NCOs. This model has worked well for the IA in the past there is nothing wrong in being proud of the fact that the Officers have led from the front and fulfilled their duty. Also deployment of the army in COIN ops has increased the ratio of officer casualties since the insurgents are often trained to target officers. The thought of changing this model is fraught with risk since it has been seen many times in the course of previous wars that pakistani soldiers have wilted easily due to the absence of officers leading them from the front (as in Kargil).

4. Napolean once said “An army marches on its stomach”. This adage is as true now as it was then. The functions that seem non core to you are as important as the function of combat. Without logistics an army is as good as a sitting dodo. Outsourcing such functions will make the army vulnerable to the incompetence of the vendors and also to their inability to face enemy fire. While I agree that the army needs to be modernised the very nature of the potential and current conflicts that it faces makes it imperative to have a large number of “boots on the ground”. No amount of technology will be as effective as the door to door operations in Kashmir. No amount of technology will give the IA a distinct edge in the Mountainous Regions where the most potential for conflict lies.

5. This again is unsubstantiated. please be more thorough with your research before making value judgements about what the army needs or does not need.

6. Please expose this myth if you have been able to collect data and have done a comprehensive analysis of what the army needs in terms of man power. Doing an Ivory tower, consultant style, efficiency analysis might work when it comes to the corporate sector, it most definitely has no place in an Institution like the IA where the cost of failure is our freedom.

Please let me know if I have missed anything.

Many Thanks

Sunil.

However, are approach varies. I wouldn’t call for budget or job cuts - on the contrary I would call for a re-assessment of CPC report and better understanding of the plight of service personnels.

As you have pointed out correctly, the Indian defense forces suffer from major leadership problems. To say the least the quality of officers is going down shockingly - there are various reasons to this. We must answer them.

Today the defense or police promises neither money nor prestige - the only thing they ever really had. Then tell me why would a smart, intelligent and sincere person join the forces? And if you do happen to answer this question please don’t be idealistic - be practical and rational.

The minister would not have dared to make such a comment had the protestors been a part of his or his party’s vote bank. The fact that the Indian armed services do not go public with their grievances does not mean that they do not have any concerns and the fact that they have been forced to come to the streets should make the minister and his government acknowledge how desperate the situation might be.

The Indian government is fooling itself if it thinks that by dragging its feet on the issue of the armed forces dissatisfaction with the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission, it can make the issue go away.

A country that refuses to respect its armed forces will eventually end up getting forces that will not respect the nations’ aspirations. A country makes a sacred contract with its soldiers that while he/she will lay down his/her life when called upon to do so, the nation will take good care of his/her and his/her family’s needs to the extent its resources would permit.

This contract underpins the very survival of a nation as when its territorial integrity and political independence are under threat, the nation looks upon the only instrument that can protect it — its armed forces.

While all governments have to look for a considered bargain between their commitments and power and between power and resources, a responsible government will always be aware of the serious implications of not spending adequate resources on defence.

The debate as it has been made out to be in some quarters between defence and development is a spurious one. Unless adequate provisions are made for defence, no state will be able to pursue its developmental agenda. This is much more important for a country like India that faces a unique security environment with two of its ‘adversaries’ straddling it on two sides of its borders and problems on all sides of its periphery.

A government can keep spouting pious rhetoric about global peace and non-violence but it realises fully that force is the ultima ratio in international relations. Politics among nations is conducted in the brooding shadow of violence. Either a state remains able and willing to use force to preserve and enhance its interests or it is forced to live at the mercy of its militarily powerful counterpart.

Even Nehru, after neglecting defence for all the years after independence had to eventually concede in 1962 that India’s military weakness ‘has been a temptation, and a little military strength may be a deterrent.’

The Indian public and press remain apathetic on defence issues. We make Kargil into a television spectacle, an opportunity for our journalists to try to show their temporary bravery by going to the frontlines for a few hours and getting the excitement of covering a war from the inside. And then when it is all over, our soldiers have been interred into their graves, we move on to new and more exciting spectacles — to our song and dance reality shows and saas-bahu sagas, forgetting that soldiers are still on guard.

This is a nation that will cry with Lata Mangeshkar [Images] when she sings Aye Mere Watan Ke Logon but will not make any effort to understand the real problems and concerns of its soldiers. It is a sign of the highly skewed priorities of the Indian media that the rising turmoil and dissatisfaction within the ranks of nations’ armed forces is being given only perfunctory coverage.

It is an issue of nation’s very survival yet the media seems busy with its devotion of superficialities. Every rave and rant of Bollywood actors is religiously covered, detailed dissection of seemingly never-ending cricket matches are conducted, exorbitant pay rises in the corporate sector make it to the headlines but the one issue that can make or break the future of this country is consigned to the margins.

We continue to pray at the altar of our false heroes while our real heroes continue to face neglect and scorn.

The armed forces feel they have never got their due from various pay commissions over the years but the government in its wisdom decided to keep the armed forces away from any representation in the latest Pay Commission. The dominance of bureaucrats meant that while the interests of the bureaucrats were well-recognised, the armed services once again ended up getting a raw deal.

The discontent is so serious that some of the best and brightest in our services have refused to go for the Higher Command Courses and more and more are seeking an early retirement. Indian armed forces are desperately trying to fill vacancies as other professions are luring the young of the country.

Against the sanctioned strength of 300 per batch, the National Defence Academy finds that it can only attract 192 cadres this year. The same story repeats itself in the Indian Military Academy. A country that purports to be a rising power is facing a shortage of more than 11,000 officers.

The reason is pretty obvious: One can’t think of any major power in the world that treats its soldiers the way India does. It is indeed a sorry sight when India’s bravest have to literally cry out for help from a callous politico-bureaucratic elite.

Our politicians remain more than willing to waste tax payers money by routinely boycotting Parliament and have never shied away from increasing their own pay and allowances, claiming that they remain underpaid. Yet those who defend the sanctity of Parliament are given a short shrift.

The abysmal knowledge of defence issues that pervades the Indian political class probably gives them an illusion that the country is being protected by divine blessings.

Political apathy and bureaucratic design are rapidly eroding the self-esteem of our forces. A functioning liberal democracy needs a loyal soldier that can take care of the state’s security, allowing the state to look after its citizenry. In India, the State is gradually withering away, all that’s left is the loyal soldier. How long will this soldier, under siege from all sides, remain steadfast to its commitments, is a question all Indians should seriously ponder on.

Dr Harsh V Pant teaches at King’s College London

If we analyse military history we find that often armies continue to remain rooted in outdated mindsets. military setbaks then provide the impetus to change.

There is merit in issues raised by pragmatic.

Also remember the rules of engagement. The American reliance on hardware and technology is what improves the T-to-T ratio, but this means that they have to stand back and blast away.

Also the ‘outsourced’ logistics teams have no conception of rules of combat or a real ability to defend themselves, and contrary to expectations they are NOT cheap. Witness the $80 a gallon of gas debacle in Iraq. The americans can afford this, we can not.

If you wish to reduce casualties then prepare to change the rules of engagement. You can not have one without the other.

Many thanks for analysing the post so critically and in such great depth. You have raised certain legitimate queries and maybe I need to improve my writing style to match your exacting standards. The issues of identity, expertise, rhetoric, opinions and facts are subjective and can be debated endlessly.
The moot point is “How do you get more bang for the buck?”.
If you check the first post in the series, the parliamentary standing committee on defence has made the same point - Can we have an equally effective army, by reducing wasteful(your definition and mine of wasteful might not be the same!) numbers and this has to be done in the light of modern management practices, current geopolitical situation and by introduction of modern technology and acquisition of latest military equipment. It is, to use a cliche, the eternal Productivity vs Production debate.
Despite its special and a preeminent role, Army is also, in many ways, like any other organisation and one neeeds to explore ways to make any organisation better. It is an area that concerns everyone - most defence observers have written about it, there have been in house studies by the Army itself and by the ministry of defence. There are many ways to look at it and I am trying to look at the whole issue through a different perspective.
I am certain, you more than anyone else, would want more resources for the beleaguered soldier and lesser Indian casualties in conflict. With the increase in defence budget unlikely and the revenue to capital expenditure ratio showing no signs of improving, this seems to be the only logical way out. I rest my case.

Neutrality in writing and opinions cannot be taken for granted and separating names from statements in fact add several confounding arguments about neutrality and possible lack of knowledge. The article above is full of rhetoric - and I will post questions that I have about the article, which I believe is written by a person who does not know much about the subject, but writes rhetoric well enough to come out sounding like he knows something:

Quote:
“While the world has flattened, the Indian Army has added to its hierarchical structure along with a significant increase in numbers.”

I would like to know what is the connection between the first half of the sentence and the second half. A great piece of meaningless rhetoric.

Quote:
“While all this has happened, there has been no talk of reduction in numbers ala the western armies. The US, UK and French military training schools are either outsourced or largely manned by civilian employees.”

Military training outsourced? Examples please. Also an analysis of how these nations might have such a large body of capable civilian military trainers based on their history and what they have been up to in the past 20-50 years to acquire and nurture such a civilian skill base.

Quote:
“No modern army worth its name runs its own logistics; their logistics is totally outsourced.”

Please name some armies that are worth their salt. I would like to be educated on how the effectiveness or role of an army can be measured in terms of salt? Is this some new kind of currency that is being mooted on an economy blog? No substance. Mo meat of facts to buttress the bare-bones rhetoric.

Quote:
“Can we have a leaner army that is as effective an insurance for the nation’s future? Arguably, yes.”

And arguably NO. If you study the needs of counterinsurgency operations, you find that there may be a need for more men. And the “outsourced” army that is worth its salt, the US army is hiring too. Shouldn’t we of the aforementioned flat world be copying that? Or is it only the author’s, one sided anonymous opinions on a non peer reviewed blog count?

Quote:
“Notwithstanding this pontification, acquisition of modern military equipment and implementation of latest military strategy in the current geopolitical scenario should have led to a concomitant reduction in the strength of the army”

“Should have”? “latest military strategy”? What is he/she talking about? Whose strategy? Under what circumstances? Details. Details. Where are the details? Ignorance of military strategy and history is so easily covered up by bluster and more of the very pontification that author claims to oppose.