So, as we enter November, and a number of Indian indicators start to improve, it is certainly worth asking ourselves, has India turned the corner? Will India lead the emerging markets charge during the next global expansion?

I am not, I am sure, alone in feeling that this is a distinct possibility, and, indeed, a similar view was expressed only last week by Sharmila Whelan, senior economist at CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets.

“We do expect the Indian business cycle to be the first to bottom in Asia. And, it should, in theory, be first to emerge,” Sharmila Whelan, senior economist at CLSA, said “The worst will be over by mid-2009 and by 2010 you should be able to see the next investment-led business cycle taking root.”

To the two reasons Wehlan offers us as an explanation for why we should expect India to do better than most (and, perhaps of particular nore here, better than China) – the fact that Indian trade constitutes only about 32.5% percent of gross domestic product (only about half the China figure – thus India is better protected from fluctuations in global trade) and the fact that India (unlike say Russia or Brazil) will be a large net beneficiary from falling commodity prices – I would add a third, India’s very favourable demographic profile, which will mean that over the next decade India can continue to draw on the benefits of a young and rapidly growing labour force at just the time when 30 years of once child per family policy starts to bite really hard on the new labour market entrant cohorts in China (for example).

Inflation Screeches To A Halt

India’s inflation held near a five- month low at the end of October, seemingly validating the central bank decision to reduce interest rates to bolster economic growth. Wholesale prices were up 10.72 percent in the week to Oct. 25 from a year earlier after gaining 10.68 percent in the previous week, according to the latest data from the commerce ministry.

Of equal importance is the fact that the weekly rate of inflation (week on week) recently turned negative, as energy and commodity prices drop back, and as a result the wholesale price index has now been dropping for eight consecutive weeks after peaking in the August 30 week.

One of the reasons inflation is weakening is of course the fact that Indian GDP growth has been slowing, and the current growth rate is clearly significantly below the 7.9 per cent rate registered in the second quarter (2008 calendar year) a rate which was already notably lower than the 8.8 per cent one reported for the January to March quarter. But with countries from the US to Germany, to Russia and maybe even China (who knows at this point) falling into or near to negative growth, then even a 7% rate looks decidedly healthy to me. What was it they were saying not so long ago about “Hindu growth”? Better a tortoise than a hare in some contexts, but then again, a 7% tortoise is certainly no mean one.

It is interesting to note in passing that the IMF – in revising their forecast down to 6.3% for 2008 – stated that they consider this level to be considerably below India’s potential growth. For the time being, it seems, the old “overheating” debate has become a thing of the past. These days we all love India, now don’t we?

Ironically, the current global situation is also making India’s measured pace of economic reform look wiser than before. At a time when Western countries are frantically nationalising banking assets, the Indian government’s reluctance to sell more than 49% in its state-owned banks—which control some 70% of banking assets—now seems reassuring. In addition, India has not yet introduced full capital-account convertibility, which protects its currency, while its careful control of foreign borrowings by domestic companies limits dependence on the global financial system. Regulators have also periodically introduced curbs to slow the formation of potential asset bubbles, such as higher provisioning and prudential requirements on real-estate lending.
The Economist

“For India we have marked our forecast down to 6.3% of 2009 calendar year. That is considerably below what we consider to be India’s potential growth,” IMF deputy director for Asia Pacific region, Kalpana Kochhar said. “There is a specific meaning to “potential” – it is the rate at which you can grow without causing inflation. And for India we estimate that to be 7.5% to 8%. Our forecast of 6.3% would put it quite a bit below the potential,”.

Obviously there are still varying forecasts, with the RBI and the central government being rather more optimistic than most, although India’s central bank did reduce its growth forecast on October 24 down to 7.5 percent from 8 percent for the year to March 31. This prediction, if fulfilled, would mean the 2008/09 expansion would be the slowest in four years, but then in the midst of the largest global recession since the 1930s that doesn’t sound so bad, now does it?

Interest Rates Coming Down and Monetary System Stabilising

The Reserve Bank of India cut its benchmark rate on Nov. 1 for the second time in two weeks, joining policymakers across Asia in lowering borrowing costs to shield their economies from the global financial crisis. For the first time since 1997, India’s central bank on Nov. 1 deployed all three of its main tools to shore up growth after inter-bank lending rates climbed to as much as 21 percent. The move seems to have substantially improved liquidity in the financial system, and overnight call rates fell sharply.

The Reserve Bank of India lowered its benchmark repurchase rate to 7.5 percent from 8 percent. At the same time the central bank also reduced the cash reserve ratio to 5.5 percent from 6.5 percent, and and cut the amount of money lenders are required to keep in government bonds to 24 percent from 25 percent.

The RBI is also considering giving an additional 100 billion rupees ($2.1 billion) each as lines of credit to National Housing Bank and Small Industries Development Bank of India, according to Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram speaking during last week. The idea here would be to increase cash flows for mortgages and for small companies.

Rupee Rises Slightly

The rupee climbed 3.8 percent last week to close at 47.66 a dollar at the 5 p.m. in Mumbai on Friday. The increase represents the biggest weekly gain since March 1996, making the rupee currently the best performer among Asia’s 10 most-active currencies outside Japan.

In addition on the foreign currency front, the Japanese Yen is also dropping back slowly against USD, which means that yen “carry” may be slowly starting to recover. A surge in USD-Yen (and hence yen carry) would be another clear sign some key emerging markets we about to start moving, in my view. As we can see from the chart – unless we have more “turmoil” to cope with moving forward – October 24 seems like it represents some kind of turning point.

Stocks Start To Tick Up Again

The Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive Index has also rebounded, and is up 17 percent since the bottom on Oct. 27. The index added 2.4 percent on Friday. The MSCI core index for India is also up 6.74% so far this month. After all that falling over the last twelve months, it is that little upturn since the start of November (see chart below) that we would like to see consolidate and continue. Of course, this may be yet another false start, and there may be another shoe to drop, but perhaps there are reasons for just a little more optimism at this point.

And the general MSCI Emerging Markets Index also looks as if it may well have turned.

Emerging Bonds Start To Rebound Too

Emerging market bonds have also started to recover, if we look at the JPMorgan EMBI+ chart, we can see what appears to be quite a robust “bounce back”. Of course for some countries (Eastern Europe, Argentina etc) the worst is still not over, but India may well be relatively insulated from too much fall-out here.

Not Much Sign Of A Rebound In Commodities Yet

On the other hand, with growth in the OECD countries likely to be bordering on negative in 2009, and Russia and China both likely to have substantial slowdowns, there are not too many signs at this point of any recovery in commodities, if we look at the Reuters-Jefferies chart.

But since India is a large net commodities importer, this is hardly bad news. Oil prices were sedentary Friday following a large scale sell-off during the week, – and this despite a forecast from the International Energy Agency that put the price of crude at $200 per barrel by 2030. Light, sweet crude for December delivery rose 27 cents to settle at $61.04 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange, although the contract had dropped below $60 in earlier overnight electronic trading for the first time 19 months. This is all now a far cry from June, when oil was trading at $147.

India’s Foreign Exchange Reserves Continue to Fall

India’s foreign exchange reserves declined again at the end of October – for the sixth consecutive week – and fell by $5.532 billion to reach $252.883 billion for the week ended October 31. India’s reserves have fallen by more than $31 billion in the past one month alone, and are now well below their $318 billion April peak. But on the other had they are still substantial and not far different from what they were 12 months ago, following a very substantial rise over the previous nine months. So if they do not fall too much further, then it isn’t evident that there is any real problem at this point.

Sustained dollar selling by the Reserve Bank of India in the forex markets, huge amounts of FII outflow from the domestic equity markets, and the revaluation of the reserves have been the main factors pressurising India’s reserves, but all these factors are symptomatic of the general pressure which has come to bear on “higher risk” emerging market economies as a whole as the financial turmoil and associated uncertainty have raged in the United States and Europe, and there is little real evidence of “India specific” factors at work here, indeed Indian exceptionalism would rather be in the fact that – absent commodity export dependence – India’s reserves have not been taking the same sort of pounding Russia and Brazil’s have.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) also said on Friday that it will lend foreign exchange – via foreign excahnge swaps – to banks with overseas operations to help them meet their lending requirements, a move that many Indian banks had been asking for, and which should help ensure adequate funding for their foreign subsidiaries. Following the central bank’s announcement, banks will buy dollars from RBI at the reference rate plus three-month forward premium and will return dollars to RBI after three months, in case of three month swaps.

Additionally, the central bank has also extended a lifeline to banks for funding the swaps by allowing them to borrow through its regular liquidity adjustment facility (LAF). The LAF is the window through which it lends to or accepts money from banks, for the corresponding period at the prevailing policy rate.

Banks borrow through the LAF window by pledging government bonds. They are required to invest at least 24% of their lendable funds in government bonds; this portion of their deposits is called the statutory liquidity ratio, or SLR. In view of the tight liquidity conditions, RBI reduced the SLR by 1% to 24% on 1 November. RBI also said on Friday that if a bank did not hold enough government securities to pledge, it would consider relaxing the SLR requirement if the bank approached it.

The use of swaps helps banks obtain cheaper funds for buying dollars because they can now borrow from the central bank repo window at 7.5%. Previously banks needed to convert their rupee deposits – raised at a rather costlier 10.5-11% – into dollars.

India’s Industry Resists The Global Slowdown

Despite the fact that India’s industrial output plummeted to a 1.3% year on year rate in August, there are some signs that the situation may be improving. The first of these are the September performance indicators for the coal and cement sectors, the rise in which pushed up the growth in output in the core infrastructure industries to 5.1% in September. According to government data made public on Friday, coal production was up by 10.7% in September 2008 while cement production rose by 7.9%.

Core sector growth in August was just 2.3% – and the six core industries have a weight of 26.7% in the index of industrial production (IIP). On the other hand growth in electricity generation remained weakish – at 4.4% – in September. If compared with the growth rate in August this year, electricity generation was the worst performer among the six sectors, with an abysmal growth of 0.8% in August 2008. Of the six core industries (crude oil, petroleum refinery products, coal, electricity, cement and finished carbon steel), only coal and cement really registered strong growth rates in September 2008. So I guess we have to wait till mid-week now to see the complete September figures.

However, despite what may well turn out to be an improvement in September IP over the August number, it does looks very much as if activity at Indian factories fell to its lowest level in three and a half years in October as the global financial crisis and slowing export demand hit the country’s manufacturing sector. The ABN AMRO Bank purchasing managers’ index (PMI), based on a survey of 500 companies, slumped to a seasonally adjusted 52.2 in October, its lowest since the survey began in April 2005 and sharply below September’s 57.3. A reading above 50 signals expansion while a figure below 50 suggests contraction, and the manufacturing PMIs are interesting, since they do offer us a sort of “real time” snapshot of what is actually happening.

“The outlook for the manufacturing sector appears to be bleaker in the backdrop of tough local and global economic conditions,” said ABN AMRO Bank N.V. senior economist Gaurav Kapur.

So the point here would not be that Indian industry is in absolutely perfect condition (it is obvious that it isn’t), but rather that, at a time when global manufacturing generally is taking a huge beating, Indian industry is hanging on in, by its fingernails, but it is hanging on in.

In comparison, the JPMorgan Global Manufacturing PMI posted 41.0, its lowest reading since data were first compiled in January 1998 and a level below the no-change mark of 50.0 for the fifth month in a row.

Output, total new orders and new export orders all contracted at the fastest rates in the survey history in October. With the exception of India, which again bucked the global trend, all of the national manufacturing surveys posted declines in output and new orders. The impact of the downshift in global market conditions also had a far-reaching effect on international trade volumes. Although new export orders fell at a slower rate than total new business, all of the national manufacturing sectors covered by the survey (including India) saw a reduction in new export orders.

“October manufacturing PMI data reinforce the stark retrenchment that the sector is currently facing, with production, total new business and new export orders all falling at record rates. The latest Output Index reading is consistent with a fall in global IP of almost 8%. The only positive from the surveys was a decline in input prices for the first time since August 2003.”
David Hensley, Director of Global Economics Coordination at JPMorgan

Returning finally to India, perhaps somewhat significantly the export order index in the PMI survey contracted for the first time in the survey’s history, coming in at 49.7 in October, compared with 53 in September. Manufacturers blamed poor global financial and economic conditions for the result. But this should not surprise us too much either, since India’s exports grew at their slowest pace in 18 months in September. Overseas shipments, which constitute about 15 percent of the Indian economy, were up 10.4 percent (to $13.7 billion) from a year earlier, following a 27 percent gain in August. Imports also increased – by 43.3 percent to $24.4 billion, with the result that the trade deficit widened to $10.6 billion.

“The global financial and economic headwinds adversely affected foreign demand for Indian manufactured goods,” said Gaurav Kapur, an economist at ABN Amro Bank in Mumbai. “The growth of total incoming new work to the Indian manufacturing economy lost considerable momentum.”

So, in conclusion, I am not saying that everything in the Indian garden is simply perfect, rather I am simply pointing out that during times which are hard for everyone, India has some advantages to lean back on, and looks set to have a lot less serious downturn than many other emerging economies may experience. So to end, almost where I started, with CLSA’a Sharmla Whelan, I do expect the Indian business cycle to be the first to bottom in Asia, and I would most certainly agree that “it should, in theory, be first to emerge”.

Since then, the government has collected Rs.74972.36 crore as cess, but only Rs.902 crore has been allocated to the Oil Industry Development Board (OIDB) that is supposed to disburse the money to the industry.  In fact, the last allotment of Rs. 95 crore to the OIDB was done in 1991-92. The balance money has gone to the Consolidated Fund of India and added to other revenue accruals.

The cess was doubled in 2002 from Rs. 900 per tonne to Rs.1800 per tonne, and further increased to Rs. 2500 per tonne in 2006, on the ground of providing subsidies to LPG and kerosene. As per the Oil Industry (Development) Act, the amount collected by levying cess on indigenous crude is to be utilised for the development of petroleum sector; the cess was never intended to cover subsidies – either directly or through oil bonds.

Cess is only applicable to pre-NELP [New Exploration Licensing Policy] blocks or acreage given to national oil companies (NOCs- ONGC and OIL) on a nomination basis in which the licensee may be one of the NOCs. The blocks that pay cess on oil are: nomination blocks held 100 per cent by NOCs (for example, Mumbai High), joint venture blocks that were awarded as field development contracts (such as Mukta, Panna, Ravva), and exploration blocks that went on to production (such as PY-3, CB-OS/2).

Now that the petroleum sector has been deregulated and opened for private sector, there is no justification of continuing this cess at all. The private companies still pay about half the cess not paid to the government as increased profit oil [amount of production paid to the government under the production sharing contract] and corporate taxes. Recent newsreports indicate that-

The government is obtaining legal opinion for imposing a special oil tax on the domestic crude oil production under the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP). The proposed tax is supposed to kick-in after price of domestically-produced crude oil crosses the $75/barrel mark. While public sector oil producers like ONGC and Oil India would have to fork out to the government 100% of additional realisation beyond the cut-off price, private companies like Reliance Industries (RIL), Essar Oil and Cairn India would be required to pay 40% of their windfall gains.[ET]

Cess, customs duty, excise duty, sales tax, education cess, pollution cess and now a special oil tax. Considering the amount of revenue collected by the government[central and state], the net subsidy provided  to the public on petroleum products is only a political statement, with insignificant net financial entailment.

Coupled with the charade of Oil Bonds, the cess imposed on the indigenous crude oil produced by NOCs is an implicit arrangement of meeting the subsidy burden and artificially containing government’s budgetary deficits. All these measures are but an indicator of the byzantine and befuddled nature of the government budgetary process. It is time someone took up cudgels to streamline and simplify the convoluted government fiscal setup, both of revenue collection and of expenditure.

There are three duties/ taxes collected by the government on the sale of petroleum products. The state governments collect the sales tax while the excise and custom duties go into the kitty of the central government.

Now, let us take a look at the actual revenue collected by the government from excise and customs and subsidies provided via the oil bonds and direct subsidies on LPG and PDS kerosene. During the last three years:

The government has now announced that it will issue oil bonds worth Rs 94,600 crore in the fiscal year 2008-09. If the revenue collection rises at the same rate, it would be to the tune of around Rs 77,000 crore in 2008-09. The subsidy for kerosene and LPG is at around Rs 3000 crore. So, the government will suffer a net loss of nearly Rs 20,000 crore in providing petroleum products to the citizens of India. Phew! 0.4% of GDP wiped out in one go.

These figures might themselves portray a wrong picture. For the first quarter of 2008-09, the government had decided to issue bonds worth Rs 24,500 crore while estimated losses of the Oil Marketing Companies (OMC) were at Rs 52,000 crore during the period. Moreover, the government’s share of meeting under-recoveries through oil bonds is now 57% from the earlier 42.7% of the total under-realisation on fuel sale. Another 33 per cent comes from upstream companies like the ONGC, GAIL and OIL. The remaining losses are borne by the OMCs themselves.

These oil bonds are a very neat short-term solution that pledge our tomorrow for a cosy today. The interest rates at these bonds are estimated at around 8.75 to 9.5% and reports suggest that the RBI has now stopped purchasing them under the special market operations(SMO). Under the SMO, the central bank used to buy the oil bonds directly from the OMCs and pay them the equivalent amount in dollars, allowing them to buy supplies. In the current year, the interest burden on the oil bonds is budgeted at Rs 5520 crore. With the  issue of oil bonds this year, this burden will become onerous and will cost the exchequer around Rs 13,000 crore in the next fiscal.

All this will add to the burgeoning fiscal deficit this year. But the finance minister, with his wizardry, of keeping the oil bonds out of the official fiscal deficit, will still be able to peg the the fiscal deficit at 2.5% of the GDP.

The more prudent mechanism of granting statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) status to the oil bonds has also not been accepted by the government. The SLR status gives immediate relief to OMCs by way of liquidity induced by participation of bigger players like banks, gilts and mutual funds, apart from existing pension, provident fund and insurance players that trade less and hold on to the papers till maturity (around 10 years). The SLR bonds are highly secured and liquid in nature as they are sovereign guaranteed. SLR bonds are those issued by the government at market rates to fund its various borrowing activities every year. Banks are required to subscribe to them, as they are mandatory requirement stipulated by the Reserve Bank of India. Currently, banks maintain 25% of their net demand and time liabilities in SLR.

Thus, while free pricing mechanism for oil products in India remains a pipe dream, granting SLR status to oil bonds seems to be the judicious course of action. However, the bonds that typically come under SLR, or statutory liquidity obligation, form part of the fiscal deficit. The government, bound by the FRBM act, is thus avoiding the SLR status for oil bonds like a plague.

There is big trouble with this sanctimonious approach of the government towards maintaining the fiscal deficit within the stipulated target. A similar exercise at fudging the balance sheets by a corporate house would have attracted the ire of the government auditors. Keeping the ethics of governance apart, the present approach has far-reaching implications for the oil industry. OMCs will continue to bleed and the cost of burden-sharing on the part of the upstream companies will rise. Both will become victims of a serious financial crunch, which will adversely hit their plough back and investment plans.

The government, too, will not emerge unscathed. This resort to oil bonds, besides being blatantly unethical, is neither fiscally prudent nor does it tackle the problem posed by spiralling oil prices, falling growth rates and rising inflationary pressures effectively.

Update – Vikram S Mehta in today’s Indian Express asks some pertinent questions on oil pricing:

…why does the government persist in appointing committees comprised of professionals to address what is essentially a political subject? Surely they must know that no individual worth his professional salt can help the government skirt the political conundrum of volatile petroleum prices. Why does the government not now contemplate kicking the ball into the court of the politicians? After all if there is to be progress it can only be if the politicians resolve somehow the political dilemmas of oil. My suggestion is that the next committee on petroleum should comprise of politicians and should be asked to come up with bold and practical suggestions on ‘how’ to implement what everyone knows must be done.

Update 2 (September 04) – Urjit Patel, writing in the Business Standard, highlights the dangers of RBI acting as an oil spigot and contends that the scenario is emblematic of the insidious distortions in virtually the entire energy chain.

It is estimated that oil bond issuance over the current fiscal could be about 2 per cent of GDP; therefore, the money due to the oil companies from the Union government is expected to be huge for the foreseeable future. Unless there is a sharp correction in oil prices or a policy combining adjustment in domestic retail prices and reduction in government duties, the oil companies will continue to require help to source the foreign exchange to import crude oil (although the SMO has been ascribed as a temporary facility). If demand does not adjust, supply will; reports of long lines at diesel pumps in several states show that the oil companies are responding in a manner that is feasible for them. In some parts of the country, demand for diesel for generation sets has increased after the recent price hike because electric supply shortages have intensified. The whole scenario is emblematic of the insidious distortions in virtually the entire energy chain in India.

Several conclusions and observations can be made. First, the dire fiscal situation that the central government finds itself in has now sucked the RBI in its vortex, but it is to be hoped that a durable alternative mechanism will be put in place with alacrity to ensure that the SMO is not further resorted to; it can be argued that some of the hard work over the past decade to ensure that the RBI’s proximate objective for conducting monetary policy is not compromised — by getting stuffed with government paper — has been undone. Secondly, we would be hard-pressed to name another country (even among those that subsidise fuel) that has had to resort to the central bank in this manner. Thirdly, praying for international crude prices to adjust sharply downwards soon does not constitute government policy, sound or otherwise. Fourthly, the proceeds of the oil bonds upon maturity will be in rupees, hence the RBI, if it wants to rebuild official foreign currency assets to make up for the decline on account of the SMO, will have to intervene in the market at the time and buy foreign currency at the ruling market exchange rate (the central bank shoulders an exchange rate risk if rebuilding foreign currency reserves is an objective).

Though I have never invested in the shares of Reliance Industries, my recently gleaned understanding of the world petroleum scenario has made me respect the company’s vision in its refining projects. As I mentioned once earlier, RIL’s existing refinery, and the one nearing construction, reportedly have unparalleled flexibility to process heavy, high-sulphur (so-called sour) crude, especially that emanating from Iran. This crude sells at a huge discount to other crudes; once it is refined into diesel, though, RIL is able to sell the resultant distillates, especially diesel, into a world market which is thirsty for such products.

Most mature consumers, the US especially, have made no investment in refining capacity over the last 2 decades, and strategic thinkers in the petroleum industry go so far as to say that RIL’s investments are changing the pattern of world flows in petroleum and petroleum products.

For this reason, I have recently turned from a bear on RIL to a mildly positive neutral. Until last week, that is. With Mulayam Singh and Amar Singh all but in the ruling coalition, suddenly life has become difficult for Mukesh Ambani. The first salvo across his bows was a minor irritant, namely the questioning of concessional import duty paid on two private jets.

More significantly, there are now calls for a ‘windfall tax’ on profits RIL is making on its refining operations. Nothing could more arbitrary than such a tax; windfall taxes have been discussed in the US, on the extra profits oil companies make when commodity prices suddenly ramp up – the implicit logic being that the companies have done nothing to earn this extra profit. I disagree with such taxes, in any case, since anyone who invests in an industry, resource-based or otherwise, runs the risk of prices being lower than he anticipated – in which case he is not compensated by the exchequer.

But in the proposal that RIL be taxed, all one sees is the vindictiveness of those opposed to him. If RIL is making higher profits than other refineries, this is due to its far-sightedness in investing in a more complex and sophisticated refinery. The profits accruing from such an operation are far from a ‘windfall’, a term normally used to describe a lottery win, for example.
If this nonsensical suggestion is accepted by the government, it will send out a signal that Indian governance is of the banana republic variety.

Mohit Satyanand is consulting editor at Outlook Money

Vikram S Mehta, chairman of the Shell Group of companies in India, provides the structure of the price build up for petrol and diesel by the public sector companies in India.

Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) calculates inter alia the landed import duty paid price of petrol and diesel every fortnight. This calculation is based on a formula that is linked to international prices. IOC’s landed price of petrol in Mumbai for the second fortnight of May was, for instance, Rs 38.1 per litre and for diesel Rs 48.8 per litre. The marketing companies had to, in other words, pay this amount to the refiners to buy the products. Next, the Central government imposes an excise and educational cess on the purchase cost. In May, this was Rs 14.4 per litre and Rs 0.4 per litre for petrol and Rs 4.6 per litre and Rs 0.1 per litre for diesel respectively. The total cash required by the marketing companies to purchase petrol and diesel in May was, therefore, Rs 52.9 per litre for petrol and Rs 53.6 per litre for diesel. The companies then sell these products at the ministry of petroleum mandated price of Rs 49.7 per litre for petrol and Rs 35.6 per litre for diesel (Mumbai prices). As such, they lose Rs 3.2 and Rs 18 for every litre of petrol and diesel sold respectively.

That, however, is not their total loss. They have to also pay sales tax to the state governments. In Mumbai, this tax is Rs 10.6 per litre and Rs 7.1 per litre for petrol and diesel respectively. Thus, the total cash loss suffered on account of the sale of 1 litre in Mumbai is Rs 13.7 and Rs 25.1 for petrol and diesel respectively. This is, in other words, the amount by which prices would have to be increased at the retail outlet for the companies to simply break even on a cash basis. Such a hike is, of course, out of the question.[Indian Express]

Many in the public domain believe that the imbalance can be redressed by reducing the central and local taxes to make the public sector oil companies profitable. However, it is actually not about reducing the taxes to bring the prices down. That is just an indirect way of maintaining the subsidies. On one hand, the balance sheets of the oil companies might look healthier and higher profits might allow theme to disburse handsome dividends. On the other hand, the government revenues would come down and higher revenue deficits will bring the finance ministry into the FRBM dragnet. It is not a Morton’s fork but a Hobson’s choice for the government — to link the retail rates of petroleum products with the market rates.

In case of most other commodities, the high consumer price checks demand. This helps restore the supply-demand balance. As prices are not linked to the rising market rates, oil demand is not checked commensurate with the price change. It obviously creates an asymmetry in the supply-demand balance and can be only restored at much higher prices. By then, it might be already too late for the Indian economy.

Now let us look at two sensible, yet asynchronous, viewpoints on resolving this pricing conundrum. In the same piece, Vikram Mehta prescribes the policy framework for a comprehensive petroleum policy.

First, we should accept that high oil prices are here to stay. This does not mean we will not see sharp declines from present levels. What it does mean is that we will not see prices stabilising at levels significantly below a triple digit number. Second, we must create a mechanism that leads to a ‘graduated’ reduction in subsidies, an orderly alignment of domestic prices to international levels and a more efficient disbursement of financial support to the poor. Third, we must reverse ‘dieselisation’. And finally, we must recognise that the sine qua non of energy security is a robust and competitive domestic petroleum and energy sector.

Fellow blogger Atanu Dey has a much simpler, but more innovative solution to offer to redress this perverse subsidy for the rich.

The basic economic truth is that there is really no such thing as a free lunch. Today’s subsidy comes at a cost that will only grow larger the longer the delay in pricing petroleum products at full cost. It is fairly simple to remedy the situation. Raising the price at the pump is the simplest but the most politically risky. The UPA government knows that and will definitely not risk losing power even if raising prices is for the larger benefit of the economy.

But those subsidies have to be reduced, if not totally abolished overnight. A start could be made immediately to reduce the subsidy to the rich while continuing it for the poor. A mechanism for doing so would be to impose a tax on car owners which would reflect the full cost of the petrol they use. Depending on the size of the engine and average fuel consumption, an annual fee could be assessed which has be paid to maintain registration. So if a particular make and model of car typically consumes, say, 1,000 litres of petrol a year, the tax could be Rs 10,000.

This type of a mechanism would leave all two-wheelers, three-wheelers, and buses untouched. Since it is usually the common man who uses public transportation, the common man would continue to enjoy the subsidy.[Deeshaa]

One can only wonder if Rs 200,000 crore in oil subsidies, nearly 2% of India’s GDP, is not alarming enough for the government to pay heed to such sensible opinions.

What is interesting in Daniel Yergin’s FT piece is that he deftly sidesteps the question of predicting the future for oil price—near-term or in the long-term. In recent years, he has been proven wrong. His Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) has been bearish on oil since 2004-05.

More important rather than interesting are his comments on the skyrocketing cost of everything from rigs, to ships to technical and skilled personnel. Clearly, for many reasons, the world needs to slow down. Central banks (or more precisely, governments) are unwilling to let that happen. The result is going to be more inflation (for a year or two) and less growth and eventual deflationary bust.

There is no dearth of commentary that predicts an imminent end to oil price. Usually, things happen unexpectedly, just as the rise of oil price itself to present levels. Now that every one and his dog is praying for or predicting a collapse in oil price, I wonder if it would happen now.

In any case, here are two samples of commentaries that call the oil price unsustainable:

In fact, John Hussman finds the contango in crude oil futures as heralding a big slump just as it did in 2006 when the price of oil dropped from around USD 80 to USD 55 per barrel.

He has exited his position in crude oil and has reduced his position in precious metals to 2%. How he proposes to reconcile that with his bearish stance on equities in the U.S.A is something that I have not been able to ask since I do not have his email address. Then, there are the comments by Mr. George Soros. He blamed it on speculators. One Michael Master in his testimony to the US Congress on the oil price spike. He has said that it is caused by index investors.

I do not recall hearing of him before this testimony. Suddenly, his name is everywhere.

It is not clear if these prognostications confuse wishful thinking for forecasts, for buried within its crevices, the Wall Street Journal carried an article on the oil producers shipping less crude than before.

This article refers to the rising consumption in Saudi Arabia and the rapidly declining export from Mexico. It is an interesting read and manages to finish on an optimistic note, somewhat inexplicably (i.e., that is falling oil price). Brad Setser makes an interesting point that this article was buried too deeply in the inside pages of WSJ than it deserved to. See this interesting post by Brad Setser.

Talking of inexplicable conclusions that did not flow from the discussions that preceded it, this paper by researchers by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas does the same thing. It argues, explains and convinces us that oil prices are justifably high. Then suddenly it concludes that sustaining triple-digit prices would be difficult.

It is funny and a different story that different people have different persons in mind for “speculators”. If you add them up, just about every one would be deemed a speculator while, of course, all those who invest in stocks that sustain Wall Street are fundamentally driven, analytical and rational.

I think America does not want to see the price of oil to drop so much that it angers the Sheikhs in the Arabian sands so much that they stop writing cheques for bankrupt Wall Street institutions.

See this article for confirmation on America speaking with forked or multiple tongues on this matter. And see this too.

The first line is a gem: “Hank Paulson, the US Treasury secretary, will invite oil producers to invest their petrodollars in the US while urging them to take steps to curb the price of oil in the medium term on a tour of the Gulf that begins on Friday”.

Once America has finished re-capitalising its financial institutions, it would not be averse to seeing the oil price collapse. In fact, it might even actively conspire to bring that eventuality about for biting the hand that fed them is part of longstanding Western tradition.

Geopolitical gains are not trifle if the price of oil continues to remain high, it would also put paid to any fledgling ambition of China (or even the distant India) to overtake America. At the very least, it would push the time-frame out by a few years and with some luck, few decades:

Credit Suisse’ s Dong Tao wrote in their “Emerging Markets Economics Daily” dated May 30, 2008 that Xu Xianchun, deputy director of the National Bureau of Statistics, has suggested that inflation might not peak until 2009 (p. 15).

The longer the oil stays elevated, the longer the persistence of inflation in China and the greater the policy challenge. In the meantime, more money would keep coming into China in search of appreciation.

Brad Setser estimates the rise in monthly reserves in China at USD 74 billions in April. Given that dollar appreciated in April, the actual sum could be about USD 82 billion, nearly a trillion dollar annual rate! There is no need to analyse this. China’s policy is totally and utterly rudderless. Brad Setser is way too polite on this one.

So, for what it is worth (you might be better off tossing a coin to decide), my forecast is that the price of crude oil would drop to about USD 110-115 or so. That is about it. It would then go back to 150 to drive one final nail into Asian economies, shower riches on West Asia and re-capitalise America. Then, once it has done its damage, the missile would be allowed to extinguish itself or burn itself out (pun intended).

A table of inflation rates in many countries around the world is beginning to reveal a disturbing picture. The lowest rate is found in Germany – at 3.0%. Many emerging countries that seem to be doing a truthful job are reporting inflation rates in excess of 10% and some in excess of 20%. Others, either out of deliberate intent or methodological deficiencies, report far less. India belongs to the latter category.

Inflation is the world’s number one problem. Governments are pretending to respond. In the UK, Mr. Gordon Brown wants to assemble experts to debate solutions. The Indian finance minister says that western nations are diverting land for producing expensive bio-fuels to replace the expensive crude oil. Surely, that is part of the problem. But that does not explain the jump in the price of rice. Rice is not diverted to bio-fuel production.

In India, the response has been to reduce import duties, impose export caps and accuse manufacturers and distributors of collusion and cartel-like behaviour. Different ministers speak in different voices. Together, these pronouncements do not constitute a policy whole.

In simple terms, prices reflect the balance of supply and demand of something. When prices go up, it is a reflection – and not a consequence – of supply going down or of demand going up or both. When it happens for just one or few commodities, it is possible to blame middle-men of hoarding or manufacturers of cartel-like behaviour. When it happens in many commodities, it is futile to blame one industry or a few producers.

Usually, the source lies in some policy measures and their implementation. To make it clear, we are not dismissing the importance of factors like climate change, diversion of land for production of bio-fuels and more importantly, stagnation or even outright decline in agricultural productivity in countries like India and China. Again, they explain inflation in food and agriculture commodities. These factors do not explain inflation in crude oil and copper, for example.

If we have to identify a single or the most important explanation for the recent development in prices of many commodities, the answer lies in examining the behaviour of global central banks.

Of course, in any broad-brush analysis or conclusions, there is the risk that we miss the exceptions who behaved differently and correctly. For example, within the constraints imposed by the political system, Reserve Bank of India has done a very good job of trying to shield the Indian economy from the cycles of boom and bust. Similarly, if the Australian and New Zealand economies still face the risk of boom and bust, it is not because of their central banks but in spite of their best efforts.
The bulk of the blame has to be assigned to the American Federal Reserve and the People’s Bank of China. In the case of China as in the case of India and in many other developing countries, the central bank is not independent. It is subject to political influence. The Federal Reserve Board of America is, in some ways, a similar predicament. It is subject to the oversight and pulls and pressures of the democratically elected Congress members. Further, since it was founded by banks actually, it ends up coming to the rescue of banks sometimes to the detriment of the public.

In 2001-2003, it cut the Federal funds rate to 1.0%. It thus rescued the economy from the collapse of the technology bubble in 2000. Thus, it replaced the stock market bubble with a housing bubble. When the housing bubble appeared to be weakening, it refused to tighten regulations and allowed it to continue. Too many loans were made to people who should not have been lent. That is the root cause of the present problem.

In order to address the resulting loan defaults, stress on banks and their balance sheets, the Federal Reserve has allowed banks to borrow at cheap rates from it. Money is available to banks in the open market but at higher cost. Some of the banks might not have survived. But, that would have also left a lesson for other banks that they would not have forgotten for a long time. Excessive risk-taking would have been curbed. Instead, the cheap money is perhaps being channelled into speculation on commodities prices. After all, banks are not going to create more mortgage loans at least for quite some time.

Somewhat different has been the behaviour of China but it achieves the same result. China has kept its currency cheap. Keeping the currency cheap requires interest rates to remain low, in comparison to other countries but also in relation to economic growth. China has done that. Low interest rates means capital is plenty. So, capital-intensive growth has flourished. That has placed tremendous demand on resources worldwide such as crude oil, coal, steel and other industrial metals. It continues to import rising quantities of iron ore, copper and crude oil. Incidentally, it has also led to China supporting many tyrannical regimes in Africa including that of Zimbabwe. Recently, it sent a shipment of arms to Zimbabwe but faced an avalanche of protest and had to recall that shipment.

Perhaps, it is possible that American banks know that there won’t be any change in China’s demand for commodities in the near future, at least until the end of the Olympics. China may be reluctant to change course fearing unknown and uncertain consequences. If so, it argues for further rise in the price of commodities. Both their behaviour and bets might be feeding off each other. That is not good news for the rest of the world.

After all, we cannot influence the Federal Reserve. So, how should policymakers respond? Unfortunately, the answer is that they should respond differently from what they have done until now. Banning exports of agricultural commodities exposes the hollowness of farmer-friendly policies. Farmers should be allowed, with appropriate guidance, to sell to the highest bidder – local or global – and derive the maximum gains from the global shortage. Such a price signal would also encourage productivity improvement in farmland and hence boost crop production. More land would be brought under cultivation. At the same time, poor households – rural or urban – could be directly subsidised with cash transfer to be able to pay the higher price.

The same principle can be extended to the price of hydrocarbon products such as petrol, cooking gas, diesel and kerosene. Consumers and producers should receive the price signal. Without that, their respective behaviours would not change and shortages or glut would persist.

At the same time, since supply of food and other commodities would take time to respond to price signals, central banks should be allowed to restrain demand in the short-run with tight monetary policy. That means higher cash reserve ratio or higher interest rates or both. That might be unpopular or politically unacceptable. But, effective medicines never taste sweet. Only placebos do.

The chances of such sound policies being pursued are close to nil particularly as many democratic governments, including India, approach elections soon. Authoritarian governments do not care much for public opinion.

Given such a low chance for sound economic decision-making, prospects for a sustained decline in inflation should be judged remote. That is not good news as it is a stealth tax on the public and erodes their purchasing power. Consequently, it reduces affordability for many assets. As demand drops, inflation affects revenues for companies and squeezes margins through cost pressures. That does not augur well for the stock market.

The stock market in India has performed well in recent times. Many other global markets have staged a similar recovery. That is due to misplaced optimism on the American economy. As discussed above, right policies would be missing and hence the anticipated quick economic turnaround in America would be elusive. Consequently, risky assets globally would retrace their recent gains. Therefore, Indian stocks would fail to build on their recent gains. On the other hand, the likelihood of continued high global and local inflation would result in a resumption of the uptrend in gold price that has been recently disrupted. Therefore, investors who do not expect inflation to recede know exactly what they should be selling and what they should be buying.

In the short run: Spin-off Benefits

A space program generally involves the development of cutting edge technologies. Even if something has been done before, and particularly if it has been done before, it can be done in a more efficient manner. Till 2005 ISRO had received 150 patents (not all international) and equally importantly had transferred 268 technologies to industry. In an age where we cannot compete with China on producing new PhDs and fall woefully short of the developed countries, it makes sense to invest good money on a space program if it can generate technologies which Indian industry can commercialize. In a way this would optimize meager resources.
Eventually patent royalties can help finance the space agency, but that is besides the point. Focusing on a space program using nationalist jingoism and defense hawkishness to drum up support can actually help stimulate industry with hi-tech inputs, besides acting as an incubator for world-class research capabilities. This would actually enable us to “splurge” on space research. Of course the aim should be to reach the standards of the best in the world, and aggressively seek to commercialize spin-off effects and rake in the royalties to make the research self-sustaining, eventually.

In the medium run: Strategic Advantage

India’s current space ambitions are something we would not have realistically thought likely even 10 years ago. The Space Recovery Experiment was a fantastic achievement. If the Chandrayaan mission is successful we will have high quality remote sensing maps of the moon, and also will have landed a craft on the moon. Over the next 2 decades, we aim to send a human into space, and eventually to the moon. Maybe even have a manned space station.

If our ambitions are remarkable then they are so by our own standards. In the United States, which is the leading space faring nation right now, these achievements have become so mundane that private industry is aiming to commercialize them. While Virgin will take customers to space, Bigelow Industries already has a prototype (unmanned but with living organisms) space station in orbit. Google is sponsoring a competition for organizations to land a spacecraft on the moon, with little or no government assistance.

That takes a lot of the glory out of the achievements but it does raise another important point: commercial exploitation of space technologies is becoming the newest frontier for business and the sky is literally the limit here. We do not know at this stage how big this business is going to be in the near term, so there is no urgency for India Inc to jump in immediately. But as ISRO builds these technologies for the future, it should ensure our domestic economic are not denied an edge that could be crucial.

In the long run: Necessity

Predicting future trends beyond a few years is always wrought with danger. Based on current trends there are two resources for which human civilization should eventually have to look to space for: solar power and mineral resources.

The sun is a huge nuclear fusion reaction and economically capturing power from the sun is the holy grail of the energy industry. When the technology is feasible, space-based solar power would be a resource that will beat any form of solar power generation on earth.

Big as the current energy crisis on earth is, in the longer run a bigger problem concerns our pursuit of mineral resources. As urbanization grows our cities are getting bigger and bigger – as are our buildings. A logical extension of this growth would be the eventual construction of the giant structures propagated in arcology. Currently designs exist for buildings that can house upto a million residents, and such buildings will become cities by themselves.

An era of such mega structures is imminent, and in view of our dwindling mineral resources and growing environmental concerns we are likely to look to space to meet our requirements. A time when mineral resources from the moon or the asteroids is comparable in cost to those from earth is very far. But when that time arrives the space faring nations will beat a huge advantage – especially if extra-terrestrial matter is going to get “colonized” by us humans.

Conclusion

A space program even while catering largely to defense and political needs, presents a big opportunity to give the economy a competitive edge in the short, medium and long run. Even though this mutual benefit is not a foregone conclusion the upside potential certainly exists and only remains to be adequately exploited.

India imports about 76 per cent of its crude oil requirements which amounts to an oil import bill of around $50 billion every year. India’s crude oil import bill rose by 3.48% in rupee terms and 16.67% in dollar terms during the first half of the current fiscal year. The appreciation in rupee value by 12.3% this year, the most since at least 1974, has helped partially offset the sharp rise in global oil prices. As per the Government, every one rupee appreciation in the exchange rate of Indian rupee against US dollar will help reduction in the net oil import bill by around Rs 3950 crore. It should help that the rupee is forecast to advance 3.4 percent next year to 38 per dollar by the end of December, according to the median estimate of 22 strategists surveyed by Bloomberg News.

CNBC-TV18 believes that at current rates, petroleum has an under recovery of nearly Rs 9.5 per litre, diesel Rs 11.3 per litre, LPG Rs 380 per cylinder, and kerosene Rs 21 per litre. However, Indian Express estimates the loss to marketing companies for petrol at Rs 8.74 a litre, diesel at Rs 9.92 per litre, kerosene Rs 20.53 a litre and LPG at Rs 256.35 per cylinder.

As per the government policy of 2003, the subsidy component by the government has remained constant since 2004-05 at Rs 22.58 per per LPG cylinder and Rs 0.82 per litre of kerosene. The balance subsidy is provided by the marketing companies from their own pockets.

The gross under-recoveries in 2006-07 by the three oil marketing companies – IOC, BPC and HPC – were Rs 28584 crore for kerosene and LPG, and Rs 20803 crore for petrol and diesel. The estimated under recoveries by oil marketing companies during April- September 2007 have been Rs13814 crores on kerosene and LPG, and Rs 12549 crore on petrol and diesel. If current price trends hold, the under-recoveries to the marketing companies are estimated to be around Rs 70,000 crore this financial year — around o.75% of India’s GDP. This has to be shared between the three marketing companies, the upstream companies – ONGC, Oil India and GAIL – and the government. The upstream oil companies have already contributed Rs 8788 crore for the period April- September 2007 to partially compensate these under-recoveries by the oil marketing companies. The contribution by the upstream companies in 2006-07 was Rs 20507 crore and is likely to rise by another 5000 crore this year.

In 2006-07, the government issued oil bonds worth Rs 24,121 crore to marketing companies for the four products, while it had issued oil bonds worth Rs.11,500 crore in 2005-06 for losses in marketing LPG and kerosene. The government has decided to issue bonds worth Rs 23,457 crores this year, which is not likely to meet the estimated deficits of the marketing companies.

If additional bonds are not issued by the government this year, the deficit can only be met by increasing the domestic prices of the products. The last time the domestic prices of petrol and diesel were raised was in June 2006. The prices of petrol and diesel were revised downwards twice afterwards, in November 2006 and in February 2007.

Domestic pricing continues to be a politically sensitive topic, with a broad consensus across the political spectrum to stall any upward revision of prices. There is a Group of ministers, chaired by Pranab Mukherjee, to suggest an alternative model for pricing of domestic products. As with the Indo-US nuclear deal, the left and the right are both opposed to any hike in prices of domestic petroleum products. The government is also worried about the inflationary impact of higher domestic prices of petroleum products. A cut in the customs duty on the crude oil and in the excise duty in petrol and diesel by the government is likely to keep the prices suppressed for some more time.

The subsidies, whether direct and transparent by the government or indirect as in tax cuts, oil bonds and compensation by government owned upstream companies, are a drain on the resources of the government. The losses to the exchequer can only be reduced when the consumer pays the right price for the product.

Note – Reuters has an interesting factbox summarising the oil subsidies by various Asian countries, including India and China.

Neither the commercial viability, nor the putative military strategic benefits, were adequately scrutinised.

The commercial case for the project rests on the time and cost saved due to a shorter route. The time saving will be most significant for India’s domestic littoral trade. If ports on either coast improve their efficiency, bulk cargo and container ships may be able to provide an attractive alternative for domestic freight that currently depends on India’s inefficient railways and abominable highways. As for international trade, Indian ports have a long way to go before the canal route can be compelling enough for global shipping for global shipping companies to consider.

Jacob John points out in a recent issue of the Economic and Political Weekly, project benefits are being overstated. “The promises of the project may be valid for some ships,” he concludes, ”but there has been a serious deficiency in studying its impact for other ships. This deficiency is likely to make the project economically unviable and more expensive for some ships to use. It is a project that is also likely to cost considerably more than what was originally proposed due to a lack of study on the amount of dredging needed. Given the likely escalation of costs and its extremely limited benefit, there is a need for mechanisms that ensure accountability of the project to its original claims”.

The trend in the shipping industry is towards larger ships. The canal, however, will allow only the smaller ships (those less than 20,000 DWT) to pass through. Even these have to slow down to be piloted across the canal.

It is inexcusable for the government to sink public funds into a project of questionable viability without a study of alternative means to achieve the same objectives. For instance, investing in improving highways and domestic gas pipelines can arguably achieve the same economic goals, with much larger external benefits.

It is possible to bring economic development to coastal Tamil Nadu without having to create another public sector behemoth. It is possible to improve domestic trade by building better highways and making the railways more efficient. And it is possible to strengthen maritime security by buying more hovercraft and ships for the coast guard and the navy. But if the government goes ahead with the project, it will not be possible to repair the damage it will cause to the environment. That alone should compel the government to explore alternatives than to stubbornly insist on sinking money down the Palk Strait.

Excerpted from “Dredging the Palk Strait”, Pragati – The Indian National Interest Review, Issue 7 – October 2007. Download | Subscribe